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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
JOSEPH TERRY SIEBOLD,
Plaintiff - Appellant,

vs.
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden,
Utah State Prison,
Defendant - Respondent.

"I

j

Case No.
10551

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STA TEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Appellant, Joseph Terry Siebold, appeals from

a Judgment of the Third District Court, Salt Lake

County, State of Utah, Aldon J. Anderson, Judge,
denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the Third Dictrict Court on November 19,
1965. Pretrial was held December 3, 1965, and a hearing was held January 6. 1966, before the Honorable
Aldon J. Anderson. Judgment was entered January
11, 1966, denying the petition based on the court's
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the judgment of the
trial court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent accepts the statement of facts as
presented in appellant's brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT APPELLANT HAb
BEEN DEPRIVED OF ANY FEDERAL OR STATE CON·
STITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

1

A. APPELLANT KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY
WAIVED HIS LEGAL RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY EX·
AMINATION.

I

THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT APPELLANT WAS I
DENIED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL.

B.

The record shows that appellant and his co·
defendant had discussed the matter of a prelimin·
ary examination prior to appearing before the
committing magistrate and that they had decided
against it. (R. 64) It is clear from the record that the
committing magistrate, R. A. McConkie, justice of the
peace in Uintah County, advised the defendants
of their right to a preliminary examination and the
nature of preliminary examinations. Appellant was
also advised that he had a right to counsel. (R. 88-89)
Appellant thereupon waived preliminary hearing.

i

,

;
'
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89) It is not denied that neither defendant was
represented by counsel at this time.

(R.

At the time set for arraignment in the Fourth
Judicial District, Judge Joseph E. Nelson requested
of the defendants whether they wished to be represented by counsel. They answered in the affirmative and a continuance of thirty minutes was granted for a conference with Ray E. Nash, court appointed counsel.
During that conference, Mr. Nash told both appei:ant and Mr. Desmarais that they had waived
preliminary examination and that if they wanted
one it would be granted by the court. Counsel then
explained what a preliminary examination consisted
of saying, "We will just merely parade their witnesses and get all the story from all the witnesses
they have." (R. 94)
The defendants decided to plead guilty to the
robbery charge because, as they said, "they got us
dead-to-rights so there's no need to go into that."
(.94) The defendants also decided not to have a preliminary hearing on the charge of assault with intent
to commit murder. (R. 95).
Thereafter, appellant was given an additional
opportunity to discuss at length with Mr. Nash the
merits of the State's case against him; however,
appellant again decided against having a preliminary hearing.
Although appellant was not represented by
counsel at the time he first waived preliminary ex-
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amin::ition, his failure to request a preliminary examination following appointment of counsel, who
advised him that he could recall preliminary examination, negates his claim that he was denied his
legal rights to a preliminary hearing.

In McGuffey v .Turner. 18 U.2d 354 at 356, 423
P.2d 166 at 167 (1967), this court, in reversing a
District Court ruling granting a writ of habeas corr::us, stated:
It is the practice in the trial courts of this state to
remand a criminal case for preliminary hearing
when the defendant requests it at arraignment when
the preliminary hearing has been theretofor waived.
It is rather difficult to see how a guilty defendant
is prejudiced by waiving a preliminary hearing when
all that is entailed at the hearing is that sufficient
evidence be given to the committing magistrate to
cause him to believe the defendant guilty thereof.

This court has held in State v. Freeman, 94 Utah
125, 71 P .2d 196 (1937), that bfore a defendant can
be bound over to District Court he is entitled to a
preliminary examination unless, with consent of the
state, he waives such hearing. If such hearing is
waived, defendant thereby implies that the evidence ,
the State would have produced would have been
sufficient to justify the magistrate holding him for
arraignment. The defendant thereby consents that
he be held for trial, and no witnesses need be pro·
duced.

1

1

1

1

Appellant cites Hamilton v. Alabama. 368 U.S.
52 (1961) and White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963)
for the proposition that failure to appoint counsel ;
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prior to appellant's waiving preliminary examination
requires reversal of the conviction even though no
prejudice has been shown.
In Hamilton, the court held that arraignment
could be a "critical stage" when, as in Alabama, the
defendant, if he is to raise the defense of insanity at
all, must raise it then. InWhite, the accused, unrepresented by counsel at a preliminary hearing, entered a plea of guilty to a capitol offense. Thereafter, he
entered a plea of not guilty at the time of his arraignment. The plea of guilty was offered in evidence at
the trial. The United State Supreme Court said that
in view of the fact that a plea could be entered at
the time of a preliminary hearing, and was in fact
entered, a preliminary hearing in this situation was
a. "critical stage."
In DeToro v. Peppersack, 332 F.2d 341 (4th Cir.
1964), the court ruled that under Maryland law, as
modified since the White decision, a preliminary
hearing was not a critical stage of the judicial process as defenses not raised were not irretrievably
lost. Therefore, failure to appoint counsel prior to
preliminary examination did not violate the accused's constitutional rights. At 332 F.2d 343 the
court said:
In our view, Hamilton and White teach that an
accused is denied rights afforded him under the
sixth amendment when he is subjected to an arraignment or to a preliminary hearing without the
assistance of counsel, where events transpire that
are likely to prejudice his ensuing trial ....
. . , the thrust of Powell's [Powell v. Alabama, 287
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U.S. 45 (1932) J admonition that an accused has a
right to counsel 'at every step in the proceedings
against him,' as borne out by subsequent decisions
including Hamilton and White, seems to be that
if the effectivness of legal assistance ultimately
furnished an accused is likely to be prejudiced by its
prior denial, the earlier period may be deemed a
critical stage in the judicial process and a conviction
obtained in such circumstances is rendered invalid,
We find nothin gin the Supreme Court decisions,
however, that would permit us to extend the duty
of the State to appoint counsel in proceedings where
even the likelihood of later prejudice arising from
the failure to appoint is absent.

It should be noted that the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Latham v. Crouse,
320 F.2d 120 (1963), handed down subsequent to
both White and Hamilton, ruled that an accused has
no constitutional right to be furnished counsel at a
preliminary hearing in a state court capital case. In
that case, two individuals by the names of Latham
and York were responsible for a series of killings
throughout the United States, and were tried and
convicted of murder in Kansas after being apprehended in Utah. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
relied on its previous decision in Utah v. Sullivan,
227 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1952), stating:
The first contention is that petitioners were entitled
to have counsel appointed for them prior to the preliminary examination. Heavy reliance is placed ~n
the decision of the United States Supreme Court m
Gideon v. Wainwright, Corrections Director, 372
U.S. 385, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799. That case
concerned the right of an accused to counsel at
trial - not at a preliminary hearing. In State v.
Sullivan, in State of Utah v. Sullivan, 10 Cir., 227
F.2d 511, 513, certiorari denied, sub nom. Braasch
v. Utah, 350 U.S. 973 S.Ct. 449, 100 L.Ed 844, we
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held that in circumstances where an accused did
not enter a plea of guilty at a preliminary hearing,
did not make a confession, did not testify and did
not say anything of an incriminating nature, the
failure to furnish counsel at such hearing did not
abridge that accused's fundamental constitutional
rights. That decision is controlling here. No claim
is made of any incriminating statements or acts of
ths petitioner at the preliminary examination. All
they did was waive the right to a preliminary hearing. Prejudice is asserted on the ground that counsel
would have forced the prosecution to disclose at
least some of its evidence. The point is not well
taken as more than a month in advance of trial
copies of the confessions and list of the prosecution
witnesses were given defense counsel. Our conclusions in State of Utah v. Sullivan are supported by
the decisions of other circuits. We find nothing in
Gideon v. Wainwright which requires a review of
the decision in State of Utah v. Sullivan.

This holding was reiterated recently in Lovato
v. Cox, 344 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1965) a per curium
opinion. The court noted that the preliminary pro
ceedings were entirely independent of the prisoner's formal arraignment and sentencing, and at the
time of preliminary hearing, the prisoner had already signed a statement. He appeared before a
justice of the peace without counsel and thereafter
at the time or arraignment entered a plea of guilty.
The court concluded the prisoner was in no way
deprived of any constitutional right.
It is submitted that under Utah law a preliminary hearing is not a "critical stage" and that appellant was in no way denied his constitutional rights
when without counsel he first waived preliminary
hearing.
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Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 385 (1963), is
not in point. "That case concerned the right of an
accused to counsel at trial-not a preliminary he 3Jing." Latham v. Crouse, 320 F.2d 120 (1963).
In State v. Braasch, 119 Utah 450, 224 P.2d 28G
(1951), the court held, as appellant acknowledges,
that the failure to have counsel for preliminary hearing was not prejudicial.
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-16-2 (1953) provides:
No defect or irregularity in or want or absence of
any proceeding or statutary requirement, prior to
the filing of an information or indictment, including the preliminary hearing, shall constitute projudical error and the defendant shall be conclusively
presumed to have waived any such defect, irregularity, want or absence of proceeding of statutory
requirement, unless he shall before pleading to the
information or indictment specifically and expressly
object to the information or indictment on such
ground ... (Emphasis added.)

Appellant asserts that he was prejudiced on the
ground that preliminary examination would have
forced the State to disclose some of its evidence. It
is submitted that the point is not well taken as appe'.lant pleaded guilty to the charge of robbery because
he knew he was guilty and that the State could
prove it.

Appellant entered his plea of guilty to the
charge of assult with intend to commit murder after
three weeks during which time appellant's attorney
interviewed witnesses and looked into the State's
case. It was on the advice of appellant's attorney to
the effect that the State had a strong case against ,
.1

1
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him that appellant changed his plea from not guilty
to guilty. See Latham v. Crouse. pages 7 and 8. Appellant has not demonstrated that he was in any way
prejudiced by the proceedings in this case.
Respondent submits that defendant's unsuported testimony is not sufficient proof to establish appellant's contention that he did not intelligently and
voluntarily waive preliminary hearing.
This court in McGuffey v. Turner. 18 U.2 354 at
:359, 423 P.2d 166 at 169 (1967), cites favorably the
Kansas case of Wilson v. Hand. 181 Kan. 483, 311
P.2d 1009 (1957), which said:
The rule is well established that the stand!lrrl of
proof necessary to justify the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus is not met by uncorroborated and unsupported statements of the petitioner.

It is submitted that where the petitioner relies on
his testimony and that of his co-defendant to establish that he did not intelligently and voluntarily
waive preliminary hearing, the burden of proof is
not met where there is reliable testimony to the contrary indicating that they did intelligently and voluntarily waive preliminary hearing. In the instant
case, the testimony of Ray E. Nash demonstrates
that appellant did intelligently and voluntarily waive
preliminary hearing.
In support of his contention that he was prejudiced by waiving preliminary hearing without the
advise of counsel, appellant cites Harvey v. State of
Mississippi. 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir.) (1965); Carnley v.
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Cochran. 369 U.S. 506 (1962); and Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964).
Respondent submits that the decision in Harvey
is not in point as Harvey, a Negro, did not obtain
counsel until after he had entered a plea of guilty
to the charge of illegal possession of whisky, which
plea, when accepted, became final.
Carnley is not in point as the case deals with thE
right to counsel at trial and the decision holds that a
waiver of right to counsel cannot be presumed from
a silent record.
Nor is Doughty v. Maxwell. supra, in point. See
Doughty v. Sacks, 173 Ohio St. 407, 183 N.E.2d. 368
(1962). Doughty was indicted by a grand jury for
rape and, after psychiatric examination, pleaded
guilty without the aid of counsel. The United States
Supreme Court relies on Carnley v. Cochran. supra,
and Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, for its decision
in this case.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR AS A MATTER OF
LAW IN EXCLUDING FROM THE RECORD ALL REFERENCE TO EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS EXCEP'T
AS THEY MIGHT EFFECT APPELLANT'S PLEAS OF
GUILTY.

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in excluding all reference to appellant's waiver of extradition to California and his subsequent waiver of extradition back to Utah between the time of his arrest
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on August 3, 1964, and pronouncement of judgment
on September 9, 1964.
In State v. Stewart, 87 Idaho 210, 392 P.2d 180
(1964), the court held that the forum state may try the
accused regardless of the manner in which he is returned to the state.
In Thompson v. State, 197 Kan. 360, 419 P.2d 891
(1966), the court held that the jurisdiction of the
Kansas district court to the person on a charge of
having committed a public offense does not depend
on how he came into the state.
In People v. Wilson, 106 C.A.2d 716, 236 P.2d 9
(1951), cert. den. 342 U.S. 915 (1962), the California
Court of Appeals said that jurisdiction over the person of an accused is not affected by the way it is
acquired, or the manner by which the accused is
brought into the court.
In State v. Wise, 58 N.M. 164, 267 P.2d 992 (1954),
the New Mexico Supreme Court said that where a
person accused of a crime is found within a territorial jurisdiction where he is charged, the jurisdiction of the court where the charge is pending is not
impaired by the fact that the defendant is brought
from another jurisdiction by illegal means.
Respondent submits that it is the purpose of
extradition proceedings to prevent the successful
escape of any person who has been accused of a
crime; and, since this is the purpose of extradition
Proceedings, it is submitted that none of the appel·
lant' s constitutional and legal rights were violated.
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Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 657, cert. den. 340
U.S. 828 (1950).

A person who has been extradited from one
state to another and then subsequently extradited
and brought back to the first state cannot, after he
is once again held by the first state, inquire into the
legality of his extradition back to that state, or into
the right of the first state to his custody after his
committment to a penal institution therein. Dear v.
State of Ohio. 107 F.Supp. 937 (D.C.W.VA. 1952). See
also 35 C.J.S. Extradition§ 2l(b).
Respondent submits that appellant, as a matter
of record, was within the jurisdiction and the preLlence of the court which arraigned and pronounced
sentence on him. There was no way, as a matter
of law, for appellant to challenge the court's jurisdiction over him. It is submitted, therefore, that the
trial court did not err in refusing to allow the issue
of jurisdiction to be brought before the court except
as it might affect a.ppellant' s pleas of guilty to the
crimes charged. Respondent submits that the trial
court's order should be affirmed.
Even had appellant raised the issue of jurisdiction in the trial court, he could not have successfully
argued that Utah, by allowing California authorities
to extradite him, had waived jurisdiction. Utah
Code Ann.§ 77-56-25 (c) (1953) provides:
Nothing in this act contained shall be deemed to
constitute a waiver by the state of its right, power
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or privilege to try such demanded person for crime
committed within this state, or of its right, power
or privilege to regain custody of such person by
extradition proceedings or otherwise for the purpose
of trial, sentence or punishment for any crime committed in this state, or shall any proceedings had
under this act which result in extradition be deemed
a waiver by this state of any of it's rights, privileges
or jurisdiction in any way whatsoever.

This staute is a part of the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act and has also been adopted by California. See California Penal Code § 1555.2. The California Supreme Court in In Re Satterfield. 50 Cal.
Rptr. 284, 412 P.2d 540 (1966), said that a waiver of
Jurisdiction is not to be automatically implied in all
cases where the state transfers a prisoner to the
custody of another sovereign. The state shall not be
deemed to have waived jurisdiction unless evidence
demonstrates an intentional waiver.
It appears that under Utah law the state did
not waive jurisdiction over the appellant when it
allowed extradition to California.

CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that appellant voluntarily
and intelligently waived his right to preliminary
hearing. Further, a preliminary hearing is not a
"critical stage" of the proceeding and appellant has
failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his
waiver thereof. The trial court did not err by refusing
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to allow into evidence any of the extradition pro.
ceedings. Respondent submits that the trial court's
denial of appellant's petition for writ of habeas
corpus should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
GERALD G. GUNDRY
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

